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I. Introduction 
 Welfare economics has never resolved the problem of interpersonal well-being 
comparisons. One important branch of the field eschews such comparisons, relying instead on 
the criterion of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency for evaluating governmental policies.  But, intuitively, 
well-being is interpersonally comparable—at least to some extent—and, in any event, the 
Kaldor-Hicks criterion is hard to justify.  
 A different branch embraces interpersonal comparability.  Many welfare economists, in 
various subfields such as optimal tax theory, growth theory, public finance, environmental 
economics, and social choice theory, employ “social welfare functions” (SWF) as a key tool.  Let 
x, y, z, … denote different possible outcomes, i.e., states of affairs.2 The SWF methodology 
assigns a utility number to each individual in each outcome: a number such as Vi(x), the utility of 
individual i in outcome x.  These utility numbers are taken to mirror inter- as well as 
intrapersonal comparisons of well-being. Supposedly, Vi(x) > Vj(y) just in case individual i in 
outcome x is better off than individual j in outcome y.  The SWF methodology then ranks 
outcomes as a function of their corresponding utility numbers.  
 However, economists  in this tradition have never reached consensus about the grounding 
for interpersonally comparable utilities.  The key difficulty is that there is no straightforward way 
to move from the ordinary utility function representing the ordinary preferences of each 
individual, to the interpersonal utility function V(.). By an “ordinary preference,” I mean a 
preference (a choice-connected pro-attitude) that takes states of affairs (“outcomes”) as its 
arguments.  What individual k prefers in this ordinary sense is that outcome x occur rather than 
outcome y. If k’s ordinary preferences are well-behaved, there exists an (“ordinary”) utility 
function, indexed to k – denote it as uk(.)—that assigns numbers to outcomes mirroring these 
preferences.  Individual k prefers x to y just in case uk(x) > uk(y). 
 It is tempting, but naïve, to construct an interpersonal utility function by equating the 
interpersonal utility of a given individual in a given outcome with the number assigned by that 
individual’s ordinary utility function to the outcome. In other words, Vk(x) = uk(x).  This 
approach is naïve because ordinary utility functions are not unique.  Imagine, for example, that 
there are four outcomes x through w, and that i prefers x to y to z to w, while j prefers y to w to z 
to x. Then i’s preference ranking can be represented by an ordinary utility function that assigns 
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the numbers 100, 97, 93, 91 to the four outcomes, and j’s by an ordinary utility function that 
assigns them the numbers 20, 30, 22, 26.  Using these numbers to define the interpersonal utility 
function V(.), it looks like i is better off in all the outcomes than j. However, i’s preference 
ranking is equally well represented by a different utility function, namely one that assigns them 
40, 39, 38, 37; similarly, j’s ranking is equally well represented by the numbers 70, 80, 71, 74.  
Using these numbers to define V(.), it now looks like j is better off in all the outcomes than i. 
 John Harsanyi offers a clever proposal for circumventing the difficulty just described.  
Instead of using ordinary preferences as the basis for interpersonal comparisons, Harsanyi 
proposes to use “extended preferences.”  Rather than being a ranking of outcomes, an extended 
preference is a ranking of “extended alternatives.” An “extended alternative” is a pairing of an 
individual’s “personal position” and his ordinary preferences.  As Harsanyi explains: 
 [A]ny social situation can be regarded as a vector listing the economic, social, biological, and other 
variables that will affect the well-being of the individuals making up the society. Different social situations 
will be called A, B, .... 
 … Let Ai denote i’s personal position in social situation A (i.e., the objective conditions that would face 
individual i in social situation A). Likewise, let Bj denote j’s personal position in social situation B. … 
Finally, let Pi and Pj denote i’s and j’s subjective attitudes (including their personal preferences), 
respectively. 
 …[L]et A be a social situation where all individuals’ diets consist mainly of fish, and let B be a social 
situation where all individuals’ diets consist mainly of meat. Suppose that individual i has a mild preference 
for fish, while individual j has a very strong preference for meat (with a violent distaste for fish). Then 
individual i, his taste Pi being what it is, will obviously prefer fish to meat, which means that he will prefer 
[Ai, Pi] to [Bi, Pi]. But he will presumably also recognize that it is better (less inconvenient) to eat meat with 
a mild distaste for meat than it is to eat fish with a strong distaste for fish. Therefore he will prefer [Bi, Pi] to 
[Aj, Pj]. In terms of the language of interpersonal utility comparison, he will recognize that j would derive 
more disutility (i.e., would derive less utility) from eating fish than (i) himself would derive from eating 
meat. 
  Hypothetical alternatives of the form [Ai, Pi] or [Bj, Pj], and so on, will be called extended 
alternatives. A given individual’s (say i’s) preferences among such extended alternatives will be called his 
extended preferences.3    
  Simplifying Harsanyi’s terminology and notation, I will denote what he calls an 
“extended alternative” as an “individual history” or, even more simply, a “history.” A history for 
individual i is a joint specification of both the “objective conditions” that might affect her well-
being, and her preferences. While Harsanyi uses a symbol such as “[Ai, Pi]” to denote an 
individual history, I will use a symbol such as “(x; i).”  Unless otherwise noted, I will use the 
term “outcome” to mean a hybrid state of affairs consisting of both “a vector listing the 
economic, social, biological, and other variables that will affect the well-being of the individuals 
making up the society” and a vector listing the preferences of each individual—with specific 
                                                 
3 Harsanyi (1986, pp. 49, 52-53 ). See also Harsanyi (1953; 1955; 1982). For a lucid presentation of Harsanyi’s 
views, see Weymark (1991). 
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outcomes identified by lower-case letters such as “x,” “y,” or “z.”  The “individual history” (x; i) 
is, roughly, a description of what happens to individual i in outcome x: her own attributes, the 
attributes of others (insofar as these bear upon her well-being), and her tastes.  
  A given individual’s “extended preferences,” then, consist in her ranking of histories. For 
example, individual k might have an extended preference for individual history (x; i) over 
individual history (y; j): individual k might prefer a life in which her objective conditions are the 
same as i’s in x, and her preferences are the same as i’s in x, to a life in which her objective 
conditions are the same as j’s in y, and her preferences are the same as j’s in y.  Individuals’ 
extended preferences, if well behaved, will be representable by extended utility functions.  Let us 
denote k’s extended utility function as vk(.). Unlike k’s ordinary utility function, her extended 
utility function assigns numbers to histories (not outcomes) and mirrors her ranking of histories 
(extended preferences) rather than her ranking of outcomes (ordinary preferences). In other 
words, vk(.) is such that k has an extended preference for (x; i) over (y; j) just in case vk(x; i) > 
vk(y; j). 
  Harsanyi’s clever proposal is that we use these extended utility functions as the basis for 
an interpersonal utility function. Moreover, we can do so in a manner that yields interpersonal 
comparisons of well-being differences as well as interpersonal comparisons of well-being levels. 
  How does this proposal work?  First, Harsanyi posits that individuals have extended 
preferences over individual-history lotteries, not just histories; and that these preferences satisfy 
the axioms of von Neumann/Morgenstern (“vNM”) utility theory, allowing them to be 
expectationally represented by a utility function. For short, call this the vNM premise.  Let L be 
one lottery over histories, and L* a second. The vNM premise means that, for any individual k, 
there exists a utility function vk(.) such that k prefers L to L* just in case the expected utility 
assigned to the first lottery using vk(.) is greater than the expected utility thus assigned to the 
second.4 Second, Harsanyi assumes that individuals will have the same extended preferences. 
For short, call this the “homogeneity” premise. It means that, for any two individuals k and l, and 
any two histories, k has an extended preference for the first over the second just in case l does. 
                                                 
4 The general formulation of vNM theory is as follows. Let R be a set of “prizes” which, for simplicity, is 
finite. Let L be the set of all possible lotteries over those prizes. A given lottery L assigns a probability πL(r) to prize 
r, with these summing to unity: ( ) 1Lr r  R .  Assume that individual k has a complete and transitive ranking 
of the lotteries. To say that this ranking can be “expectationally represented” by a utility function wk(.) means: L is 
ranked at least as good as L* iff *( ) ( ) ( ) ( ).
k k
L Lr r
w r r w r r   R R  There are various groups of axioms 
that suffice for the existence of wk(.). One standard formulation is that individual k’s ranking of the lotteries must 
satisfy an “independence” and an “Archimedean” axiom. See Kreps (1988, ch. 5); Gilboa (2009, ch. 8).  
In order to adapt this general framework to the case of extended preferences, simply make the prize set the set 
H of all histories. A lottery, now, assigns a probability πL(x;i) to history (x; i).  To say that individual k’s ranking of 
the lotteries is “expectationally represented” by an extended utility function vk(.) means: L is ranked at least as good 
as L* iff *( ; ) ( ; )( ; ) ( ; ) ( ; ) ( ; )
k k
L Lx i x i
v x i x i v x i x i   H H .  If k’s ranking of L is complete and transitive 
and satisfies an additional group of vNM axioms, vk(.) will exist.  
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Similarly, for any two individuals, and any two individual-history lotteries, k prefers the first 
lottery to the second just in case l does.   
  The vNM and homogeneity premises, together, mean that there will be an extended 
utility function v(.) which expectationally represents the extended preferences of every person in 
the population.  For any individual k, it will be the case that k prefers history (x; i) to history (y; j) 
just in case v(x; i) > v(y; j); and it will be the case that k prefers lottery L to lottery L* just in case 
the expected utility of the first, according to v(.), is greater than the expected utility of the 
second, according to v(.).  The interpersonal utility function V(.), in turn, can be immediately 
derived from v(.) – or so Harsanyi suggests. Simply define V(.) as follows: Vi(x) = v(x; i).  In 
short, the interpersonal utility assigned to a given individual in a given outcome is simply the 
extended utility of her history in that outcome.  
  For those inclined to see a close connection between preferences and well-being, this 
proposal is appealing because it retains such a nexus, yet circumvents the problem described 
earlier in deriving interpersonal utilities from ordinary utility functions. The problem, there, 
involved the non-uniqueness of ordinary utility functions.  The extended-utility function, too, is 
non-unique.  However, its non-uniqueness does not jeopardize the proposal to use extended 
preferences as the basis for interpersonal comparisons. 
  Why not? A well-known feature of von Neumann/Morgenstern utility theory is that 
utility functions which expectationally represent lottery preferences are unique up to a positive 
affine transformation.  Assume that the vNM and homogeneity premises are true, and that 
function v(.) is an extended utility function representing everyone’s extended preferences over 
individual histories and lotteries.  Then if v+(.) does the same, v+(.) must be a positive affine 
transformation of v(.). This means that there must be a positive “scaling” factor a, and a 
“translation” factor b, which transforms the v(.) utilities into the v+(.) utilities.5  For example, 
imagine that there are four histories (x; i), (y; i), (x; j), (y; j), assigned numbers by v(.) as follows: 
v(x; i) = 10, v(y; i) = 15, v(x; j) = 17, v(y; j) = 23.  Then there must be a (>0) and b such that v+(x; 
i) = 10a + b, v+(y; i) = 15a + b, v+(x; j) = 17a + b, and v+(y; j) = 23a + b.   
                                                 
5 Return to the general formulation of vNM theory in the previous footnote, with R a prize set and L a set of all 
lotteries over the prize set. Where f(.) and g(.) are real-valued functions on R, to say that g(.) is a positive affine 
transformation of f(.) means: there exists a number a > 0 and a number b such that, for every r in R, g(r) = af(r) + b. 
Assume that k has a ranking of L which satisfies the vNM axioms and can be expectationally represented by utility 
function w(.).  Then vNM theory shows the following: w+(.) also expectationally represents k’s ranking of L iff 
w+(.) is a positive affine transformation of w(.).  See Kreps (1988, ch. 5); Gilboa (2009, ch. 8).  
Turn now to the specific case where H is the set of all histories; an individual k has extended preferences 
regarding these histories and lotteries over them; and v(.) expectationally represents individual k’s ranking of the 
lotteries. Then v+(.) also expectationally represents k’s ranking of the lotteries iff v+(.) is a positive affine 
transformation of v(.).  Since H, now, is the set of all histories, what this means is: there exists a number a > 0 and 
number b such that, for any history (x; i), v+(x; i) = av(x; i) + b.  
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  Because v(.) is unique up to a positive affine transformation, the proposal to derive 
interpersonal comparisons from v(.) yields determinate comparisons of well-being levels. 
Assume that v(.) assigns a higher number to history (x; i) than (y; j). If v+(.) is a positive affine 
transformation of v(.), then v+(.) must also assign a higher number to the first history.  
Moreover—an extra bonus—the proposal to derive interpersonal comparisons from v(.) yields 
determinate comparisons of well-being differences. Assume that the difference between v(x; i) 
and v(y; j) is greater than the difference between v(z; l) and v(w; m). Then, if v+(.) is a positive 
affine transformation of v(.), simple algebra shows that the difference between v+(x; i) and v+(y; 
j) must be greater than the difference between v+(z; l) and v+(w; m).6 
  Despite these virtues, Harsanyi’s proposal has serious flaws. In Part II of this Article, I 
describe the flaws, namely these: (1) Essential attributes.  Harsanyi assumes that the “objective 
conditions” constitutive of someone’s “personal situation” (of her “individual history,” in my 
terminology) are contingent attributes, such as income, health or social status. However, there 
seems to be no conceptual reason why well-being is just a function of contingent attributes. And, 
once a history is allowed to include essential (non-contingent) attributes, it becomes hard to 
understand what an extended preference means. (2) Wrong attitude. An individual may have the 
wrong attitude in formulating her extended preferences—an attitude that fails to explain the well-
being ranking of histories. For example, she may rank histories on moral or aesthetic grounds, 
rather than out of any concern for the subjects. (3) The “Principle of Acceptance” and Changing 
Preferences. Harsanyi, in his so-called “principle of acceptance (discussed below), requires that 
anyone’s extended preferences regarding the histories of one particular subject rank those 
histories so as to track the subject’s ordinary preferences regarding the component outcomes. 
However, this principle, as Harsanyi presents it, does not allow for the possibility that subjects’ 
ordinary preferences may not be fixed. (4) Heterogeneity of Extended Preferences. Harsanyi fails 
to establish the homogeneity premise; there is absolutely no reason to think that, in general, 
individuals will have the same extended preferences.  
  In Part III, I discuss how the flaws might be repaired, yielding an account of interpersonal 
comparisons that is quite different in its details from Harsanyi’s, but retains his central idea that 
interpersonal utilities might be based upon extended preferences and vNM extended utility 
functions. In Part IV, I show how interpersonal utilities as thus constructed can be integrated 
with an SWF—be it a utilitarian SWF or some non-utilitarian SWF (for example, a prioritarian 
SWF).  Although Harsanyi does in fact develop his views about interpersonal comparisons 
within the context of a defense of utilitarianism, there is no necessary connection between the 
axiological claim that utilities representing interpersonally comparable well-being are to be 
                                                 
6 To say that v+(.) is a positive affine transformation of v(.) relative to the set H of all histories, in the sense 
expressed in the previous footnote, is logically stronger than saying that there are subject-specific scaling and 
translation factors relating the two functions. The latter proposition means that: for each individual i, there exists ai > 
0, bi, such that, for any (x; i), v+(x; i) = aiv(x; i) + bi. Note that, if v+(.) is related to v(.) in this weaker sense, the two 
functions need not imply the same interpersonal level or difference comparisons. 
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derived from extended preferences, and the moral claim that the ranking of outcomes as morally 
better or worse is to be achieved by summing unweighted utilities (utilitarianism). 
  What is novel in this Article? The account presented in Parts III and IV, to be sure. But 
the critical discussion of Harsanyi’s views in Part II also is, to a large extent. Much of the extant 
literature on Harsanyi concerns his “aggregation” theorem rather than his account of extended 
preferences and interpersonal comparisons.  And scholarship addressing the latter topic7 has 
failed fully to canvass the problems I describe.  This is true, both of the critical literature reacting 
to Harsanyi, and of the work of other theorists (there are a few) who—like Harsanyi—have used 
the device of extended preferences as a basis for interpersonal comparisons.8 
 II. A Critique of Harsanyi 
 A. Essential Attributes 
 Recall Harsanyi’s definitions. A social situation is a description of “the economic, social, 
biological, and other variables that will affect the well-being of the individuals making up the 
society.”  Given some social situation A, a “personal position,” Ai, is “the objective conditions 
that would face individual i in social situation A.”  An “extended alternative” – what I term an 
individual history—is a combination of a personal position and individual tastes. “Extended 
preferences” are preferences among extended alternatives. 
 Let us refer to the person in a “history” as the “subject” of that history, and the person 
whose extended preferences are at issue a “spectator.”  Individual k, qua spectator, may prefer (x; 
i) to (y; j); individual i is the subject of the first history, j the subject of the second. 
 We can now turn the puzzle at hand. What exactly is a “personal position” or “individual 
history”? The ontological status of a “social situation” or an outcome is straightforward; these 
are states of affairs. The ontological status of a “personal position” or individual history is 
murkier.  (x; i) is, in some sense, a relativization of the state-of-affairs, x, to the subject i.  The 
spectator’s extended preference for (x; i) over (y; j) is meant to explain a well-being comparison 
of the two subjects.  Moreover, (x; i) and (y; j) must be possible arguments for preferences. 
 These desiderata are satisfied by conceptualizing a history as a description of individual 
properties, namely those of the subject in the outcome; and by conceptualizing an extended 
preference for a history as a preference for a certain kind of state of affairs, namely the state of 
affairs that the spectator possess those properties.  On this conceptualization, for k to have an 
extended preference for (x; i) over (y; j) means: k prefers that k have the properties of person i in 
                                                 
7 See Binmore (1994, ch. 4; 2008); Broome (1998, 2008); Gajdos and Kandil (2008); Grant et al. (2010a, 
2010b); Griffin (1991); Kaneko (1984); Karni (1998); Karni and Weymark (1998); MacKay (1986); Mongin (2001); 
Mongin and d’Aspremont (1998); Moreno-Ternero and Roemer (2008); Ng (1999); Pattanaik (1986); Roemer 
(2008); Safra and Weissengrin (2003); Sen (1986, pp. 1122-1123); Suzumura (1996); Weymark (1991, 2005) 
8 See, e.g., Arrow (1977); Kolm (1996, pp. 160-168). 
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outcome x, rather than that k have the properties of person j in outcome y.  Call this the 
“property-possession” conceptualization of an extended preference. 
 Harsanyi is far from precise about the ontology of “personal position,” “extended 
alternative,” and extended preference. However, the textual evidence suggests that he intends 
something like the “property-possession” account. For example, he suggests that an extended 
preference regarding some history concerns the possibility of being “put in the place”9 or 
standing “in the shoes” of the subject of the history.   
 [T]he basic intellectual operation in … interpersonal comparisons is imaginative empathy. We imagine 
ourselves to be in the shoes of another person, and ask ourselves the question, “If I were now really in his 
position, and had his taste, his education, his social background, his cultural values, and his psychological 
makeup, then what would now be my preferences between various alternatives ….? (An “alternative” here 
stands for a given bundle of economic commodities plus a given position with respect to various 
noneconomic variables, such as health, social status, job situation, family situation, etc.)10  
For a spectator to be “put in the place” or “stand in the shoes” of the subject is just for the 
spectator to have the same attributes as the subject.  In discussing the case where a spectator is 
formulating an extended preference between a history in which the subject eats meat and has the 
spectator’s tastes, and a history in which the subject eats fish and has different preferences, 
Harsanyi characterizes the extended preferences as follows: “[They are] preferences between 
eating meat with one’s actual taste and eating fish with a taste quite different from one’s actual 
taste.”11  In other words, the thought experiment that the spectator undertakes in comparing these 
histories is to compare his eating meat and having certain tastes, with his eating fish and having 
other tastes. 
 One worry about the property-possession conceptualization of extended preferences is 
that an individual’s well-being may depend upon others’ attributes, not just her own. For 
example, it is often thought that my children’s happiness or well-being is one determinant of my 
well-being, or at least can be. However, the property-possession account may be able to address 
this worry by allowing for the subject’s relational as well as intrinsic properties to be included in 
the description of histories, and to be part of the argument for extended preferences. Spectator 
k’s preference for (x; i) over (y; j) is a preference that k possess all of the intrinsic and relational 
attributes that subject i has in outcome x, rather than that k possess all of the intrinsic and 
relational attributes that subject j has in outcome y. 
 A cross-cutting problem, and the one I wish to stress, concerns essential attributes—more 
precisely, properties of the subject that the spectator essentially lacks (for short, ELk properties, 
with the “k” subscript referring to the spectator, k). ELk properties are properties (intrinsic or 
                                                 
9 Harsanyi (1986, p. 50). 
10 Harsanyi (1982, p. 50).   
11 Harsanyi (1986, p. 53).  
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relational) that k cannot possibly possess—properties that k does not have in any possible world 
where she exists.  
 For example, imagine that the spectator is a woman, Sue, currently living and born in 
1980.  Sue is told about a possible life that Cleopatra might have led, (x; Cleopatra), a possible 
life that Shakespeare might have led, (y; Shakespeare), and asked to formulate her extended 
preferences between the two.  But—on the property-possession account—this thought exercise 
involves Sue comparing two impossible states of affairs. Cleopatra was a woman born in the first 
century B.C.; Shakespeare, a man born in the 16th century A.D. It is possible, perhaps, for Sue to 
have been male—her gender (by contrast with her genetic makeup) seems not to be an essential 
feature of her. Yet it is impossible for Sue to have been born when Cleopatra or Shakespeare 
was. The precise or at least rough timing of someone’s birth is one of her essential properties, 
seemingly. 
 One might deny that birth timing is an essential property—but this hardly meets the 
challenge. Which properties are essential to human persons is a matter of philosophical dispute; 
but surely some are. Consider, then, any case in which i in x has some ELk property. Then for k 
to formulate an extended preference as between (x; i) and some other history—on the property-
possession account—involves k’s preferring an impossible state of affairs. 
 The proponent of the property-possession account has two strategies for meeting this 
challenge.  One is a “severance” strategy, namely to characterize outcomes so that individuals 
have only attributes that any spectator can possess; or, alternatively (a less cumbersome version 
of the severance approach) to instruct a given spectator k to compare a given pair of histories (x; 
i) and (y; j) by comparing a state of affairs in which k has all the properties of i in x except the 
ELk properties of i in x, to a state of affairs in which k has all the properties of j in y except the 
ELk properties of j in y.  
 The severance strategy is problematic. Nothing in the concept of well-being would seem 
to preclude certain individual attributes from playing a role in determining the welfare of some 
subject, merely because those attributes are essential (in any sense, either essentially possessed 
by the subject, or essentially lacked by some spectator). Well-being, conceptually, involves 
subject-relative goodness: if Jim is better off than Steve in some outcome, the outcome is better 
for Jim than for Steve. This goodness-for relation will be grounded in Jim’s and Steve’s 
attributes – and, if so, why not (in part) their essential attributes, even if these might be 
essentially lacked by some spectators? Why should we rule out this possibility ab initio—
particularly since the nature of essential attributes is itself in dispute? 
 Perhaps the irrelevance of essential attributes to well-being is a metaphysical rather than 
conceptual fact—as in the famous example of the metaphysical but not conceptual necessity that 
water is H20. However, metaphysical necessities emerge (paradigmatically) by empirical 
investigation. We learn by scientific investigation that the molecular makeup of the wet and 
9 
 
thirst-quenching stuff we call “water” is H20. The severance strategy does not render essential 
attributes irrelevant to well-being in this empirical manner. Rather, the nexus between such items 
and well-being is—implausibly—eliminated by conceptual fiat.   
 Consider again the Cleopatra/Shakespeare case, on the premise that birth timing is an 
essential property.  It seems very plausible, indeed, that the comparative well-being of Cleopatra 
and Shakespeare depends on their consumption, social status, hedonic states, health, 
accomplishments, sex lives, etc., and not the fact that Cleopatra was born in the first century B.C. 
while Shakespeare in the 16th A.D. But why is this well-being fact true? It is because humans, 
contemplating possible lives, care about consumption, etc., and not about birth timing per se.  So 
it is an empirical fact about human valuations that explains the welfare-irrelevance of birth 
timing. The severance strategy, by contrast, makes subjects’ birth timing (if an ELk property) 
irrelevant to spectator k’s ranking of histories even if birth timing is something that k cares 
about.12 
 The second (non-severance) strategy for handling essential properties—without 
abandoning the property-possession account of extended preferences—is to include all of the 
subject’s properties in the states of affairs that the spectator k is meant to contemplate, and to 
explain (somehow) why such contemplation is possible even if some of these properties are ELk 
properties. This second strategy has different variants. (1) Spectator Ignorance. The spectator 
might be deprived of information about her own attributes (including essential attributes), or 
instructed to ignore such information.  While it is impossible for a spectator k to have an ELk 
property, it is possible for the spectator to believe that she has an ELk property.  Sue might not 
know her actual birth timing, and instead believe she was born when Cleopatra was. Or, she 
might be uncertain about her actual birth timing, and thus be able to contemplate as an epistemic 
possibility both that she was born in the first century B.C., and that she was born in the 16th A.D.  
However, asking spectators to rank histories under a condition of ignorance about their own 
attributes is in serious tension with the desideratum that the preferences constitutive of well-
being be fully informed. (2) “Conceivability”. Some impossible states of affairs are still 
“conceivable.” For example, either Goldbach’s conjecture is true and necessarily so, or it is 
necessarily false;13 but both propositions seem conceivable.14 Moreover, the conceivability of 
impossible states of affairs might transcend the epistemic considerations discussed under the 
heading of spectator ignorance; perhaps even a perfectly informed spectator might conceive both 
the truth and the falsity of Goldbach’s conjecture. But can Sue, knowing for sure what her 
essential properties are (including, ex hypothesi, that she was born in 1980), conceive the 
impossible state of affairs of her being born around the time of Cleopatra or Shakespeare?  (3) 
                                                 
12 A second problem with the severance strategy is that the spectator, knowing his essential properties, may 
find it very difficult to imagine his having all of the subject’s properties except the ELk properties – because it may 
be nomically impossible (given the actual laws of physics, biology, psychology, or sociology) for the spectator to 
possess those properties together with his own essential properties. 
13 Mathematical propositions, if true, are necessarily true, and similarly if false. 
14 See Chalmers (2002). 
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The Semantics of “I.” Pursing a line of analysis suggested by Zeno Vendler, we might 
distinguish between Sue’s imagining that “Sue has all the properties of Cleopatra,” and her 
imagining that “I have all the properties of Cleopatra.” When Sue imagines the first sentence, she 
imagines something impossible; when Sue imagines the second (Vendler proposes) she does 
not.15 However, Vendler does not succeed in clarifying what Sue is imagining in contemplating 
the second sentence, if not the first. 
 B. Spectator Attitude  
 In Reasons and Persons, Parfit notes that someone might prefer a state of affairs which is 
too spatially or temporally remote from her to make a difference to her well-being—illustrating 
the point with the following example.  
 Suppose that I meet a stranger who has what is believed to be a fatal disease. My sympathy is aroused, and 
I strongly want this stranger to be cured. We never meet again. Later, unknown to me, this stranger is 
cured. On the [actual preference theory of well-being], this event is good for me, and makes my life go 
better. This is not plausible. We should reject this theory.16 
Many other philosophers concur with Parfit —indeed, his observation that the satisfaction of 
certain preferences (however well-informed and rational) is not well-being enhancing has 
become virtually a truism in contemporary philosophical scholarship about well-being. For 
example, Darwall writes: 
  There are many things I rationally take an interest in, such as the survival of the planet and the 
happiness of my children long after I am dead, that will make no contribution to my welfare. A person may 
have rational interests that go well beyond what is for her good or in her interest. A person’s good—what 
benefits her or advances her welfare—is different from what is good from her point of view or standpoint. 
The latter is the perspective of what she herself cares about, whereas her own good is what is desirable 
from the perspective of someone (perhaps she herself) who cares for her.17 
Scanlon writes:  
[Desire theories of well-being are] open to serious objection. The most general view of this kind—it might 
be called the unrestricted actual-desire theory—holds that a person’s well-being is measured by the degree 
to which all the person’s actual desires are satisfied. Since one can have a desire about almost anything, this 
makes an implausibly broad range of considerations count as determinants of a person’s well-being. 
Someone might have a desire about the chemical composition of some star, about whether blue was 
Napoleon’s favorite color, or about whether Julius Ceasar was an honest man. But it would be odd to 
suggest that the well-being of a person who has such desires is affected by these facts themselves (as 
opposed to the pleasure he or she derives from having certain beliefs about them). The fact that some 
distant star is made up of the elements I would like it to be does not seem to make my life better (assuming 
                                                 
15 See Vendler (1976, p. 116): “Thus whereas the man known as Zeno Vendler cannot be imagined, and cannot 
be, the man known as Claudius [the Roman Emperor], I, who am known as Zeno Vendler, still can imagine being, 
and could be, the man known as Claudius.”  
16 Parfit (1987, p. 494).  
17 Darwall (2002, p. 53). 
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that I am not an astronomer whose life work has been devoted to a theory that would be confirmed or 
refuted by this fact).18 
Arneson writes: “[N]ot all of an agent’s desires plausibly bear on her well-being. I might listen to 
a televised plea for famine relief, and form the desire to aid distant starving strangers, without 
myself thinking (and without its being plausible for anyone else to think) that the fulfillment of 
this desire would in any way make my life go better.”19 
 Not only can someone’s preference-satisfaction and well-being diverge in the case where 
she has moral, altruistic, aesthetic, or otherwise non-self-interested preferences for a spatially or 
temporally remote feature of outcomes.  Divergence can also occur where her ranking of 
outcomes differentiated only by “proximate” features is driven (wholly or partly) by non-self-
interested considerations. Felix, repentant over terrible past wrongdoing, believes in a version of 
retributivism that requires him to serve a very long term of incarceration, and therefore prefers 
on moral grounds that he serve this term, even though he would be better off with a lighter 
sentence. 
 Although Harsanyi eliminates certain kinds of extended preferences, namely poorly 
informed and sadistic ones, he does not recognize the problem adverted to by Parfit et al.—a 
problem that welfare economics, more generally, has failed to confront.  Nothing in Harsanyi’s 
proposal precludes a given spectator k from comparing (x; i) to (y; j) with the wrong sort of 
attitude, and thus making the comparison by virtue of features of the component outcomes, x and 
y, that have little or nothing to do with the subjects’ welfare. For example, k might prefer (x; i) to 
(y; j) because of the fact that x is an outcome in which cancer is cured in the 22nd century, and y 
an outcome in which cancer is never cured, even though each subject dies long before the 22nd 
century. By “the right sort of attitude,”  I mean a concern or perspective on the spectator’s part—
whatever exactly it might be—that could serve to justify the putative link between his extended 
preferences over histories, and the well-being ranking of those histories. The “wrong sort of 
attitude” is an attitude not of this sort.  
  Indeed, the possibility of a spectator who is rational, well-informed, non-sadistic, and 
otherwise normal, but has the wrong sort of attitude, can be seen to pose deep issues for 
Harsanyi. Let us return to a very basic point. The well-being ranking of lives is not, merely, a 
person-neutral goodness ordering20 of the outcomes in which these lives occur. Whether Felix’s 
life in x is better or worse than Jane’s in y is not, merely, a matter of the comparative goodness 
(in a moral sense, aesthetic sense, or any other person-neutral sense) of x and y themselves.  If 
the well-being ranking of lives were merely a matter of the goodness of the underlying outcomes, 
then in each outcome all individuals would be equally well off—which is absurd.  
                                                 
18 Scanlon (1998, pp. 113-114). 
19 Arneson (1999, p. 124). See also Bernstein (1998); Brandt (1998, ch. 17); Gibbard (1986); Griffin (1986, 
chs. 1-2); Hausman and McPherson (2009); Kagan (1992); Overvold (1980, 1982, 1984); Sumner (1996, ch. 5). 
20 By “person neutral” I mean an ordering of outcomes which is not biased toward the interests, concerns, or 
perspective of one person rather than another.  
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 Harsanyi’s construct of extended alternatives is meant as a device for relativizing 
outcomes to subjects, and thus for differentiating between the goodness ranking of outcomes and 
the well-being ranking of lives. In particular, on the property-possession account, this 
relativization is accomplished by asking k to rank (x; i) as against (y; j) via a comparison of the 
state-of-affairs in which he possesses all the properties of i in x, to the state of affairs in which he 
possesses all the properties of j in y. But the success of this relativization hinges on k’s having an 
appropriate attitude.  Imagine that k is completely impartial between his interests and everyone 
else’s. What he cares about is not what his attributes are, but only the population distribution of 
attributes.  Then k’s ranking of (x; i) versus (y; j) will ignore where each subject is located in the 
population distribution of attributes—instead comparing the two histories just by comparing the 
x distribution to the y distribution.21 In particular, on the property-possession account, a fully 
impartial spectator will be indifferent between histories (x;1), (x; 2), … (x; N) for any outcome x. 
This is absurd (if extended preferences are meant to explain well-being), and not what Harsanyi 
intends. 
 If the property-possession account were otherwise attractive, a ready solution to the 
attitudinal problem would be to require that the spectator be self-interested: to elicit her ranking 
of (x; i) and (y; j) by asking her to adopt an attitude of self-concern and, in that frame of mind, to 
compare the state of affairs in which she has all the attributes of i in x, to the state of affairs in 
which she has all the attributes of j in y. However, the property-possession account runs aground 
on the shoal of essential attributes; and the replacement account that I argue for in Part III will 
need to employ a different (and more complicated) device to ensure that the spectator has the 
right sort of attitude.  
 C. The Principle of Acceptance 
 An important feature of Harsanyi’s proposal has not yet been discussed: the Principle of 
Acceptance.22 In ranking histories belonging to the same subject, each spectator is required to 
respect the subject’s ordinary preferences. That is, each spectator’s extended preference between 
(x; i) and (y; i) is determined by the subject i’s ordinary preference between x and y.  
 The Principle of Acceptance is infected by the “wrong sort of attitude” problem: the 
subject might prefer x to y on moral, aesthetic, altruistic, or other non-self-interested grounds. It 
also presupposes temporally and modally fixed subject preferences. But of course that 
presupposition may prove false. Subject i might, at one time, prefer x to y, but later prefer y to x. 
                                                 
21 I assume that the impartial spectator reasons as follows. Ranking (x; i) over (y; j), in accordance with the 
property-possession conceptualization, he compares a state of affairs in which he possesses all of i’s relational and 
intrinsic properties in x, to one in which possesses all of j’s relational and intrinsic properties in y. But (not having a 
particular bias in favor of his own interests), he makes this comparison by considering what everyone’s properties 
are in the two outcomes, i.e., by impartially comparing the state of affairs x to y. 
22 See Harsanyi (1986) ; Weymark (1991). 
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Or, what subject i would prefer might depend upon which outcome occurs.  It might be the case 
that, were x to occur, i would prefer x to y; but that, were y to occur, she would prefer y to x. 
 D.  Homogeneous Extended Preferences 
 Harsanyi argues that spectators will have the same extended preferences.  
 Let Pj again denote individual j’s subjective attitudes (including his preferences), and let Rj denote 
a vector consisting of all objective causal variables needed to explain these subjective attitudes denoted by 
Pj. Our discussion suggests that the extended utility function Vi of each individual i should really be written 
as Vi = Vi[Aj, Rj] rather than as Vi= Vi [Aj, Pj]. Written in this form, the utility function Vi = Vi[Aj, Rj] 
indicates the utility that individual i would assign to the objective position Aj if the causal variables 
determining his preferences were Rj. Because the mathematical form of this function is defined by the basic 
psychological laws governing people’s choice behavior, this function Vi must be the same for all 
individuals i, so that, for example, Vh[Aj, Rj] = Vi[Aj, Rj] for each pair of individuals h and i.23  
 As John Broome has observed,24 this argument is flawed. Let us grant Harsanyi his 
premise that an individual’s ordinary preferences are fully determined by certain objective 
attributes of her—for short, Determinism about Ordinary Preferences.  And, following Harsanyi, 
let Rj denote the features of an individual j that fully explain her preferences.  Finally, for a given 
extended alternative (Ai, Pi), let us refer to the pairing (Ai, Ri) as the counterpart “fully objective” 
history. 
 Determinism about Ordinary Preferences, plus the further premise that the spectator k has 
full information, entails that k’s ranking of two extended alternatives is the same as his ranking 
of their counterpart fully objective histories.  Moreover, in this case, vk(.) can be expressed as 
having fully objective histories for its arguments: vk(Ai, Pi) = vk(Ai, Ri). 
 But why need one spectator’s ranking of two histories be the same as some other 
spectator’s ranking of the two? Harsanyi’s thought seems to be that a given spectator’s extended 
preferences are themselves determined by objective causal variables—for short, Determinism 
about Extended Preferences. Using Rk now to mean the objective features of k that account for 
all the aspects of his preference structure—both his ordinary and extended preferences—this 
means that spectator k’s extended preferences can be summarized in an extended utility 
function25 fixed by those features.  In other words, if vk(.) is k’s extended utility function, vk(.) = 
O(Rk). O(.), here, is a mapping from the features of a given person, k, which determine his tastes 
(Rk) to an extended utility function.  
 Determinism about Ordinary Preferences and about Extended Preferences, together, 
mean that the extended utility number a given spectator assigns to a given history is equal to the 
number he assigns to its fully objective counterpart; and that these numbers, themselves, are 
                                                 
23 Harsanyi (1986, p. 58). 
24 See Broome (1998). 
25 Unique up to a positive affine transformation. 
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determined by the spectator’s preference-determining attributes. Formally, vk(.) = O(Rk), and 
vk(Ai, Pi)= vk(Ai, Ri). But nothing here shows that vk(.) = vh(.) for any two spectators k and h – the 
conclusion that Harsanyi wrongly leaps to at the end of the paragraph above.  The determination 
of a spectator’s extended preferences by his attributes hardly means that spectators have the same 
extended preferences. After all, spectators can have different preference-determining attributes.  
Which flavor ice cream I prefer may be fully explainable by my genetics; but if my genes are 
different from yours, I might crave chocolate while you vanilla. Nothing here changes if the 
arguments for preferences are more abstruse—extended alternatives, pairings of objective and 
subjective attributes, or their fully objective counterparts, understood (on the property-possession 
account) as complexes of properties that the spectator might possess, or in some other manner. 
III.  Harsanyi 2.0: The Revised Account 
 The account proposed here (for short, the “Revised Account”) retains the most 
fundamental aspects of Harsanyi’s framework: the concept of extended preferences; the 
representation of extended preferences by extended utility functions; the use of such functions as 
the basis for interpersonally comparable utilities. The Revised Account also retains a further 
(arguably less fundamental) feature of his approach, namely the vNM premise. 
 However, the account abandons the property-possession conception of extended 
preferences, and instead employs an attitudinal conception: a given spectator’s extended 
preferences are equated with his ordinary preferences under a suitable attitude.  At one stroke, 
this shift resolves the first two difficulties with Harsanyi’s account described in the previous part, 
i.e., the problem of essential attributes and the possibility of spectators having the “wrong 
attitude.” The third difficulty, namely the possibility of variable subject preferences, can be 
handled by conditionalizing or dropping the principle of acceptance; the fourth, the possibility of 
heterogeneous spectator preferences, by pooling such preferences. 
 I discuss these moves in turn.  I then defend the vNM premise. This feature of Harsanyi’s 
view has been controversial.  Why do I retain it, even while I carve away other elements? 
 A. The Attitudinal Conception of Extended Preferences 
 The history (x; i) is, in some sense, a relativization of the outcome x to the subject i.  The 
property-possession conception is one (unsuccessful) attempt to achieve this relativization—but 
there is a different way to do so, namely by analyzing extended preferences as ordinary 
preferences with an appropriate attitudinal constraint.  Call this analysis the “attitudinal 
conception” or “attitudinal approach.” It is this conception of extended preferences that 
comprises the core of the Revised Account. 
 Consider, first, a given spectator k’s within-subject ranking of histories: his preferences 
over histories all of which have the same subject.  Spectator k is ranking the subset of histories of 
the form (x; i), (y; i), (z; i) ….  The Revised Account analyzes such preferences in terms of k’s 
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ordinary preferences under a condition of wholehearted sympathy with the subject.  In other 
words, it says the following: 
 The Revised Account: A Spectator’s Within-Subject Ranking of Histories and Lotteries 
 Spectator k has an extended preference for (x; j) over (y; j) just in case spectator k, under 
a condition of wholehearted sympathy with subject j, has an ordinary preference for x 
over y.   
 Similarly, imagine that L is one lottery over subject j’s histories, and L* another such 
lottery.  M is the outcome lottery corresponding to L (in other words, if L assigns a given 
probability to history (x; j), M assigns that probability to outcome x). M* is the outcome 
lottery corresponding to L*.  Then k has an extended preference for L over L* just in case 
k, under a condition of wholehearted sympathy with subject j, has an ordinary preference 
for M over M*.  
This account (which draws from a long philosophical tradition of analyzing well-being or 
morality in terms of the attitude of sympathy) presupposes that sympathy is a natural human 
attitude that is directed at other persons, and can be partial or wholehearted.  At a given time, I 
may be sympathetic to multiple persons, or just to one.26  
 Note how the attitudinal conception relativizes histories to subjects. Spectator k, in 
ranking (x; j) and (y; j), is not just ranking the underlying outcomes, x and y, in any old manner. 
Rather, k is ranking those outcomes with her care and concern targeted at j. Similarly, k, in 
ranking (x; i) and (y; i), is ranking those outcomes with her care and concern targeted at i.  
 Note also how this conception solves the essential-attribute problem. The spectator k is 
not asked to imagine that she possesses the subject’s attributes; and so there is no difficulty in 
understanding how an attribute which is essentially lacked by the spectator (an ELk attribute) 
might nonetheless figure in her ranking of histories.  To see in a simple way how this might 
happen, imagine that each person’s DNA is an essential feature of him. Imagine, further, that 
spectator k’s DNA is different from subject j’s, in turn different from subject i’s.  It is 
conceptually possible (although, to be sure, empirically implausible) that: k’s ranking of 
outcomes under a condition of sympathy with j is different from her ranking of outcomes under a 
condition of sympathy with i, and moreover that this difference is (wholly or partly) due to the 
fact that the two subjects have different DNA. 
 Finally, note how the attitudinal conception solves the “wrong attitude” problem. A 
spectator’s ranking of histories cannot, in general, be equivalent to her moral ranking of the 
component outcomes—for example—or to her aesthetic ranking. Rather, the spectator’s ranking 
must involve some concern or perspective on her part that serves to justify the putative link 
                                                 
26 See generally Darwall (2002). 
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between extended preferences and the well-being ranking of histories.  But sympathy is exactly 
the right attitude to justify this linkage. As Stephen Darwall has explored at length, sympathy is 
responsive to judgments of well-being.27 If I am wholeheartedly sympathetic to you, and I judge 
that you are better off in x than y, then I prefer x to y.  In particular, then—unless k makes the 
unlikely judgment that subject i’s well-being is affected by events which are temporally or 
spatially remote from i—k will rank (x; i) and (y; i) as equal if the component outcomes, x and y, 
are differentiated only by such events.   
 It is also worth observing that the attitudinal conception bears out an important truism 
about well-being: that there is a close connection (of some kind) between well-being and self-
interest.  Consider a given spectator’s ranking of his own life-histories.  What the attitudinal 
conception says, in this case, is the following: k has an extended preference for (x; k) over (y; k) 
just in case k, under a condition of wholehearted sympathy with himself, prefers x to y. But 
wholehearted self-sympathy is nothing other than self-interest.  
 The observation can be inverted. Wholehearted sympathy is a generalization of self-
interest—an attitude of interest in some particular person, be it the holder of the attitude (self-
interest), or someone else. The spectator’s within-subject extended preferences are just rankings 
of outcomes with this generalized self-interest directed at the appropriate person, the subject.  
 I have said nothing, yet, about across-subject extended preferences. What does it mean 
for spectator k to have an extended preference for (x; i) over (y; j), where i and j are different 
persons? Elucidating the content of such preferences turns out to be essential in constructing an 
extended utility function that makes determinate interpersonal comparisons of well-being levels 
and differences. To see the difficulty here, note that if vk(.) represents k’s within-subject extended 
preferences, there can easily be a vk*(.) which is not a positive affine transformation of vk(.) and 
yet which represents k’s within-subject extended preferences equally well.  Moreover, vk*(.) and 
vk(.) may well imply different interpersonal comparisons.  
     
   Utility function vk(.)   Utility function vk*(.) 
   x y z   x y z  
 Subject 1 100 300 500   1 3 5 
 Subject 2 6 7 9   60 70 90 
 Utility function vk*(.) takes each history for subject 1—histories (x; 1), (y; 1), and (z; 1)—
and assigns it a utility which is 1/100th the utility assigned to that history by function vk(.). 
It takes each history for subject 2—histories (x; 2), (y; 2), and (z; 2)—and assigns it a 
utility which is 10 times the utility assigned to that history by function vk(.). It is easy to 
see that vk*(.) represents spectator k’s within-subject preferences just as well as vk(.)—
                                                 
27 See ibid. 
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because it multiplies each history by a subject-specific positive constant—but that it is 
not a positive affine transformation of vk(.). 
 An analysis of across-subject extended preferences in terms of sympathy is unsuccessful.  
We cannot say that k has an extended preference for (x; i) over (y; j) just in case k, under a 
condition of wholehearted sympathy with the subject, prefers x to y—because there is no one 
particular person to be the target of k’s care and concern.  What mental operation is Sue 
supposed to go through when we ask her whether she prefers x under a condition of sympathy 
with Jean, to y under a condition of sympathy with Leslie? Asking Sue to make this comparison 
seems incoherent, in much the same way that it would be to ask her whether she prefers x when 
scared, to y when calm.  
 I therefore offer a different approach. Let us say that spectator k has an extended 
preference for (x; i) over (y; j), with i and j different subjects, just in case k judges that i in x is 
better off than j in y. The following can be shown: If k makes a small number of such across-
subject judgments, and vk(.) represents such judgments as well as k’s within-subject extended 
preferences, vk(.) will normally be unique up to a positive affine transformation and will yield 
determinate interpersonal comparisons of levels and differences.28 
 The Revised Account might be criticized as furnishing a circular analysis of the concept 
of well-being. One kind of circularity is patent: the account purports to analyze one aspect of that 
concept, interpersonal comparisons, by positing that “spectators” have across-subject extended 
preferences; and yet such preferences are, in turn, understood by using the very concept being 
analyzed (namely, by supposing that spectators arrive at these preferences by making judgments 
of well-being). Another kind of circularity is more subtle. Sympathy—I have suggested—is itself 
connected to judgments of well-being. But this connection is not merely contingent. It is not as if 
sympathy is some independently specified attitude which, as is happens, motivates the holder to 
act in line with his judgments of well-being. Rather, the attitude of sympathy is just that attitude 
which plays the following role: if P is wholeheartedly sympathetic to S and judges x to be better 
for S’s well-being than y, P is motivated to pursue x rather than y. Insofar as the concept of well-
being is used to identify the attitude of sympathy, which in turn is used—by the attitudinal 
approach—to make sense of within-subject extended preferences, the approach is circular. 
 But the circularities, here, are not vicious. They arise because well-being is a self-
referential property. A property is self-referential if its instantiation depends upon how 
individuals use concepts expressing that very property. This phenomenon is familiar from the 
literature on secondary properties.29 An object has the property of redness if it has surface 
reflectance characteristics which make it look red to normal observers.  Note, here, how persons’ 
perceptions or judgments of redness are an ineliminable aspect of the property of redness. 
Similarly (it seems) individuals’ judgments of well-being are an ineliminable aspect of the 
                                                 
28 See Adler (2011, ch. 3). 
29 See Darwall, Gibbard, and Railton (1992). 
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property of well-being.  In particular, one person has the relational property of being better off 
than a second only if the two have various attributes (whatever exactly they may be) such that 
individuals generally judge the first to be better off than the second. 
 Necessarily, an accurate “account” of a self-referential property cannot be a reductive 
account—one that identifies the property without using its concept. However, an accurate 
account of a self-referential property can still be very useful—and the circularities inevitably 
arising in such an account are, therefore, not vicious. For example, the account may help us pick 
out the instances when the property is instantiated or (more generally) identify the physical, 
chemical, biological, or psychological supervenience base for such instantiation.  And that is 
exactly what the attitudinal conception of extended preferences is meant to do. It is meant to help 
us construct a numerical device (utility functions) that will signal whether one person is better 
off than a second, or one well-being difference greater than a second, depending upon the health, 
consumption, social life, status, and other characteristics of the persons involved. That this 
device is constructed by asking individuals to make certain judgments of well-being is no bar to 
its construction, and the dependence of this construction on such judgments is no objection to it. 
(By analogy, the blueprint for building a successful instrument to detect redness might well 
involve asking observers which objects look red.) 
 B. Conditionalizing or Dropping the Principle of Acceptance 
 The principle of acceptance offers an alternative route to defining within-subject 
extended preferences. Rather than looking to spectators’ ranking of outcomes under a condition 
of wholehearted sympathy with the subject, the principle—as modified to require an appropriate 
attitude on the subject’s part—says: subject i’s self-interested preferences between x and y 
determine what any spectator’s extended preferences between (x; i) and (y; i) are.  But the 
principle is problematic, even in this modified form, because i’s preferences might vary over 
time or across outcomes. 
 The Revised Account might accommodate variable subject preferences by (a) 
conditionalizing or (b) dropping the principle of acceptance. The conditionalized principle says: 
If subject i at all times and in all outcomes self-interestedly prefers x to y (for short, the subject 
“steadfastly” self-interestedly prefers x to y), then any spectator must have an extended 
preference for (x; i) over (y; i). Otherwise, spectator k’s extended preferences between these two 
histories depend upon his outcome preferences under a condition of wholehearted sympathy with 
i.   
 Dropping the principle of acceptance makes the spectator’s outcome preferences, under 
this condition, determinative in all cases.  The spectator is allowed to prefer (x; i) to (y; i) even if 
the subject has a steadfast self-interested preference for y over x. 
 A live question in the theory of well-being—one of the aspects of the debate about 
whether well-being consists in “objective goods”—concerns the extent to which individuals are 
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sovereign with respect to their own well-being. If someone (under conditions of good 
information and rationality) favors one outcome over another, does that make the first outcome 
better for him? The Revised Account with a conditionalized principle of acceptance is 
“sovereignty-respecting” in quite a strong way—as we shall see more clearly in a moment, once 
the account’s mechanism of pooling utility functions to arrive at well-being comparisons has 
been presented. However, the Revised Account without the principle is also sovereignty-
respecting, albeit more weakly. First, spectators are still permitted to follow subjects’ steadfast 
preferences.  It might be an empirical fact about human psychology that—when a subject has a 
steadfast self-interested preference for x over y—spectators will tend to prefer x to y under a 
condition of wholehearted sympathy with the subject. (In other words, as an empirical matter, 
spectators might tend to be deferential to subjects). Second, even if spectators do not tend to be 
deferential, the pooling mechanism makes the approach sovereignty respecting in at least a weak 
sense.   
 C. Pooling Extended Utility Functions 
 For simplicity, assume a fixed population of interest, each member of which exists in all 
the outcomes under consideration. What have we established to this point? Each individual k in 
this population has an extended utility function vk(.) which represents his within-subject and 
across-subject extended preferences (as those are understood by the Revised Account); and this 
extended utility function is normally unique up to a positive affine transformation. 
 Harsanyi’s argument for the homogeneity of extended preferences is a failure—and this 
argument also fails in the context of the Revised Account. One spectator might make different 
across-person judgments than another. Even with a conditionalized principle of acceptance, two 
spectators might disagree in their within-subject preferences when the subjects are not 
steadfast—and, a fortiori, they might disagree if the principle of acceptance is dropped. Thus, if k 
and l are different, there is no reason to suppose that vk(.) will be the same function as vl(.), or a 
positive affine transformation thereof.  
 In turn, the heterogeneity of extended preferences would seem to pose a grave obstacle to 
the construction of the interpersonal utility function V(.).  However, that obstacle can be avoided 
by reconceptualizing V(.) – not as a single function, but as a set of functions. Let us indicate this 
reframing with bold-face:  V is the set {v1(.), v2(.). …. vN(.)}, where v1(.) is an extended utility 
function representing individual 1’s preferences (as per the Revised Account), v2(.) an extended 
utility function representing individual 2’s, …, vN(.) an extended utility function representing 
individual N’s.  vk(.), for each k, can be any one of the family of functions (unique up to a 
positive affine transformation) that represent his extended preferences.30 
                                                 
30 This description of the construction of V is, in one important respect, too simplified—because it ignores the 
possibility of intraspectator variation in extended preferences. A given spectator’s extended preferences can vary 
across times or outcomes.  (Indeed, this possibility is not logically independent from the kind of temporal and modal 
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 Inter- as well as intrapersonal comparisons of well-being levels and differences can now 
be defined with reference to V.  
 Level comparisons: Individual i in outcome x is at least as well off as individual j in 
outcome y iff, for all v(.) in V, v(x; i) ≥ v(y; j).  
Difference comparisons: The difference between the well-being of individual i in 
outcome x and the well-being of individual j in outcome y is at least as great as the 
difference between the well-being of individual l in outcome z and the well-being of 
individual m in outcome w iff, for all v(.) in V, v(x; i) – v(y; j) ≥ v(z; l) – v(w; m).  
 This account has technical virtues. It yields a well-behaved (transitive, reflexive) ranking 
of levels and differences.31  
 Substantively, the Revised Account succeeds in delivering interpersonal comparisons. In 
the case where individuals have identical extended preferences, V is such that each member is a 
positive affine transformation of every other, and inter- as well as intrapersonal comparisons are 
fully determinate. (For every pair of histories, either the first is better than the second, or the 
second is better than the first, or the two are equally good.  For every four histories, either the 
well-being difference between the first two is greater than the well-being difference between the 
second two, or vice versa, or the well-being differences are the same.) Where extended 
preferences diverge, V no longer has this structure, and there may be “pockets” of indeterminacy 
in the ranking of levels and differences—the size of which depends upon the extent of 
divergence in these preferences. 
  Moreover, the Revised Account fulfills two desiderata for a theory of well-being. On the 
one hand, interpersonal comparisons must have intersubjective validity: No single person’s 
preferences or judgments suffice to establish interpersonal well-being facts. Indeed, according to 
the Revised Account, well-being comparisons (both intra-32 and interpersonal) rest upon 
                                                                                                                                                             
variation which has been discussed, namely that subjects might have variable self-interested preferences.  Note that 
if individual k’s self-interested preferences as between outcomes x and y are not fixed, it follows that k’s extended 
preferences as between (x; k) and (y; k) will not be fixed, either—given how the Revised Account defines extended 
preferences.) 
Where intraspectator variation in extended preferences occurs—where k’s extended preferences at time t and 
in outcome x are different from his preferences at time t* and in outcome y—we need to include in V both an 
extended utility function representing the first preferences, and an extended utility function representing the second. 
See Adler (2011, ch. 3). 
31 To be precise, consider the binary relation Lev on the set H of life-histories, defined as follows: (x; i) Lev (y; 
j) iff, for all v(.) in V, v(x;i) ≥ v(y; j). Lev is a quasiordering.  Now consider the binary relation Diff on the set H x H, 
the set of all pairs of life-histories, defined as follows: ((x; i), (y; j)) Diff ((z; l), (w; m)) iff, for all v(.) in V, v(x; i) – 
v(y; j) ≥ v(z; l) – v(w; m). Diff is a quasiordering on H x H. 
32 It might be wondered why the Revised Account needs to analyze intrapersonal comparisons with reference 
to V. Why not, instead, say that within-subject level and difference comparisons are just a matter of that person’s 
preferences?  
If the Revised Account incorporates a conditionalized principle of acceptance, the two approaches amount to 
the same thing. Alternatively, the very same “objective-good” intuitions about well-being that might motivate 
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universally shared judgments and preferences. One history is at least as good as a second only if 
everyone’s extended utility function assigns the first a utility number at least as large.  In the case 
where the two histories belong to the same subject, this means that everyone (under a condition 
of wholehearted sympathy with the subject) prefers the first outcome or is indifferent; in the case 
where the subjects are different this means that everyone judges the first history to be at least as 
good.33  
 The second desideratum is that an account should be “sovereignty respecting,” at least to 
some extent. This is a constraint upon how the account makes intrapersonal comparisons. It can 
now be seen that the Revised Account– even though it makes intra- as well as interpersonal 
comparison by pooling extended utility functions – is.  Consider the case where individual i has a 
steadfast self-interested preference for outcome x over y. With the conditionalized principle of 
acceptance on hand, this fact suffices to establish that the individual is better off in x: every 
utility function in V, conforming to that principle, will assign (x; i) a higher utility than (y; i). 
Even without the principle of acceptance (and even if spectators are not deferential to subjects as 
an empirical matter), this fact suffices to establish that the individual is not better off in y. The 
individual’s own extended utility function will assign a lower number to (y; i) and thus it will not 
be the case that every utility function in V assigns (y; i) a value at least as large as the value it 
assigns (x; i). 
 Finally, it can be asked: is the Revised Account true to the rationale for preference-based 
views of well-being? What that rationale is can itself be contested—but, plausibly, it is the 
motivational features of well-being that warrant an account thereof linked to preferences.  To say 
that someone is necessarily motivated by her own well-being is too strong; after all, the 
individual’s actual goals might be other-regarding.  But, more carefully, we can say this: An 
account of well-being should be such that an individual is motivated by her welfare, when she is 
self-interested – and that others who care about her are also thus motivated.  
 The account of well-being I have proposed fulfills this motivational requirement. How? 
Note that if (x; i) is better than (y; i), at least some individuals have extended utility functions 
that assign a higher number to (x; i), and none have extended utility functions that assign a higher 
number to (y; i). Because these utility functions are derived from extended preferences (analyzed 
in turn in terms of ordinary preferences under a condition of sympathy with the subject), it 
follows that: if (x; i) is better than (y; i), at least some of those who care about i are motivated to 
pursue x rather than y, and none who do are motivated to pursue y rather than x. 
 D. Why the vNM Premise? 
                                                                                                                                                             
rejecting even a conditionalized principle of acceptance would also cut against the proposal to analyze within-
subject comparisons by looking just at the subject’s (possibly idiosyncratic) preferences.  
33 Similarly, on the Revised Account, difference comparisons rest upon universally shared judgments and 
preferences. 
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 On Harsanyi’s account, a spectator’s extended utility function is a vNM function: it 
expectationally represents her preferences regarding lotteries over histories. This feature is 
retained by the Revised Account, as follows.  For any spectator k, vk(.) is such that: for any 
lottery L over one subject’s histories, and any other lottery L* over that same subject’s histories, 
k prefers L to L* just in case the expected value of L according to vk(.) is greater than the 
expected value of L* according to vk(.).  
 But why should the utilities that represent well-being differences or levels be grounded in 
lottery preferences?34 Comparisons of well-being levels and differences have nothing, 
essentially, to do with uncertainty. At the limit, every outcome might be a possible world—a 
maximally specified state of affairs—and yet, on Harsanyi’s account, and my own, lottery 
preferences would still be invoked to explain well-being comparisons with respect to these 
outcomes.   
 vNM utilities have a key technical advantage: uniqueness up to a positive affine 
transformation. My construction, like Harsanyi’s simpler approach, indeed yields a vk(.) that is 
unique up to a positive affine transformation; and this in turn means that (absent heterogeneity in 
extended preferences) well-being level and difference comparisons are fully determinate. But 
there are other ways—without invoking lottery preferences—to arrive at a vk(.) unique up to a 
positive affine transformation. Consider the following approach.  Spectator k’s within-subject 
extended preferences with respect to histories are analyzed as before: k prefers (x; i) to (y; i) just 
in case k, under a condition of wholehearted sympathy with i, prefers x to y. Such preferences, 
plus information about k’s across-subject judgments—to the effect that (x; i) is better than (y; j), 
the two subjects different-- yield a vk(.) unique up to an ordinal transformation.35  We then appeal 
to k’s judgments about well-being differences36, eliminating ordinal transformations of vk(.) that 
do not conform to these judgments, and arriving eventually at a vk(.) unique up to a positive 
affine transformation. 
 I see no argument that decisively refutes this alternative approach.  Still, the following 
considerations can be marshaled against it: (1) Are the relevant judgments possible? The 
approach presupposes that individuals can make direct judgments of well-being differences—
“direct” in the sense of being underived from lottery preferences. It is contestable whether this is 
true. (2) Complexity. The account is more complex than the Revised Account, which constructs 
vk(.) using the twin elements of sympathetic preferences and well-being judgments, not the third 
element of direct difference judgments. (3) Motivational Link.  The Revised Account retains a 
                                                 
34 On this issue, see Broome (1995); Ng (1999); Risse (2002); Roemer (2008); Sen (1976; 1986, pp. 1122-
1123); Weymark (1991, 2005). 
35 Assume that v(.) is an extended utility function on the set H of life-histories. To say that another function 
w(.) is an “ordinal transformation” of v(.) means: there exists some strictly increasing function g(.) such that, for 
every (x; i) in H, w(x; i) = g(v(x; i)). To say that a vk(.) which represents k’s extended preferences (of some sort) is 
“unique up to an ordinal transformation) means: some other vk*(.) also represents those extended preference iff vk*(.) 
is an ordinal transformation of vk(.). 
36 See Abdellaoui, Barrios, and Wakker (2007). 
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strong link to motivation. According to that account (but not the alternative proposal now on the 
table) every intrapersonal fact about a subject’s well-being, both level facts and difference facts, 
entails a corresponding motivational fact (about the motivation of individuals who care about the 
subject).  (4) Inferences. On the Revised Account, all information regarding k’s within-subject 
ranking, relevant to the construction of vk(.), can be inferred from his choices. This is not true of 
the alternative account.37 (5) No intuitions.  Although the critical literature on Harsanyi stresses 
the theoretical point that vk(.) need not be derived from lottery preferences, no concrete example 
of how such a derivation is counterintuitive has been provided. 
IV. Social Welfare Functions 
 The Revised Account represents inter- as well as intrapersonal comparisons of well-being 
via a set V, pooling extended utility functions. I have said nothing, yet, about how this utility 
information is to be integrated into a social welfare function (SWF).  The SWF tradition, 
remember, ranks outcomes based upon individual utility numbers, which are taken to be 
interpersonally comparable; yet the theoretical basis for these numbers remains obscure.  An 
account of interpersonal well-being measurement, if successful, will fill this gap. Does the 
Revised Account do so?  
 The traditional definition of an SWF is as follows: it is some rule R for ranking the utility 
vectors that correspond to outcomes.38 The interpersonally comparable utility function V(.) maps 
a given outcome x onto a list, or “vector,” of N numbers representing the well-being of each of 
the N persons in the population. V(x) = (V1(x), …. , VN(x)).  Any two outcomes are then 
compared by using R to rank their respective vectors: x at least as good as y iff V(x) ranked by R 
at least as good as V(y).  R might be a utilitarian SWF, which compares vectors by summing 
unweighted utilities. However, R need not be utilitarian. Indeed, various standard non-utilitarian 
views in normative ethics have their counterpart SWFs. R might be a prioritarian SWF, which 
sums concavely transformed utilities; a leximin SWF, which gives absolute priority to worse-off 
individuals; or a sufficientist SWF, which uses a threshold to mark the point of absolute priority, 
and is utilitarian in making tradeoffs between above-threshold individuals and prioritarian in 
making tradeoffs between below-threshold individuals.39 
 The argument for the Revised Account of interpersonal comparisons, if persuasive, also 
shows that this traditional definition of an SWF needs revision.  The definition presupposes that 
a single utility function V(.) fully captures the well-being information that a utilitarian, 
                                                 
37 On the Revised Account, k’s extended preferences regarding the histories of subject i (perhaps himself) are 
defined in terms of k’s ranking of outcomes and outcome-lotteries under a condition of sympathy with i. This 
ranking can—in principle—be inferred from k’s choices under a condition of sympathy with i.   By contrast, nothing 
about k’s choices reveals his ranking of differences between histories (even histories belonging to one subject, even 
himself). 
38 See generally Blackorby, Bossert, and Donaldson (2005, chs. 3-4); Mongin and d’Aspremont (1998); 
Bossert and Weymark (2004). 
39 See ibid. On the possibility of a sufficientist SWF, see Brown (2005). 
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prioritarian, sufficientist, or leximiner would need to rank outcomes. But the argument for the 
Revised Account denies that. Instead (given the possible heterogeneity of extended utility 
functions), we will generally need a non-singleton set V in order to numerically represent facts 
about well-being levels and differences. V can be a singleton only in the limiting case where 
extended preferences are identical. 
 However, the requisite amendment to the traditional definition is straightforward.  An 
SWF is the following recipe for ranking outcomes, which integrates a rule R for ordering utility 
vectors, and a set V of utility functions.  V consists of scalar-valued utility functions, which map 
histories onto real numbers, and this set represents the well-being levels of histories and 
differences between them as per the representational rules discussed above.40  Each member v(.) 
of V is also naturally associated with a vector-valued function defined on outcomes,41 namely:  
v(x) = (v(x; 1), v(x; 2), …, v(x; N)).   And an SWF combines R and V to rank outcomes, as 
follow: 
 Outcome x at least as good as outcome y iff, for all v(.) in V, v(x) ranked by R at least as 
good as v(y).    
The “better than” and “equally good as” relations between outcomes can be derived from this “at 
least as good as” relation in the standard way, namely: x better than y iff x at least as good as y 
and not y at least as good as x; x and y equally good iff x at least as good as y and y at least as 
good as x. 
 SWF scholarship typically imposes certain minimal constraints on the rule R.42 It is 
straightforward to show that—if R is required to satisfy these constraints--the recipe in the 
previous paragraph produces a “well-behaved” ranking of outcomes, one satisfying the accepted 
transitivity, symmetry/asymmetry, and reflexivity/irreflexivity properties of the “better than” and 
“equally good as “relations. It can also be shown that, with R thus constrained, this recipe 
satisfies what John Broome calls the “principle of personal good.”43 If each person is equally 
well off in x and y, then x and y are equally good. If everyone is at least as well off in x as 
compared to y, and at least one is better off, then x is better than y.44 
                                                 
40 See Section III.C. 
41 I see little risk of confusion in using “v(.)” to denote this function as well. 
42 Those constraints are as follows: (1) Complete ordering.  R, used to rank any given set of utility vectors, 
produces a complete ordering of that set. (2) Anonymity. If v(x) is a permutation of v(y), R ranks v(x) and v(y) as 
equally good.  (3) Strong Pareto.  If every entry in v(x) is at least as large as its corresponding entry in v(y), with at 
least one strictly larger, R ranks v(x) as better than v(y).  
43 Broome (1995). 
44 (1) Assume that each person is equally well off in x and y.  Because V represents well-being via the 
representational rules discussed in Section III.C., it follows that, for each i in the population, v(x; i) = v(y; i) for all 
v(.) in V.   Thus the vector v(x) is the same as the vector v(y) for every v(.) in V, and thus v(x) and v(y) are ranked 
equally good by R for every v(.) in V.   (2) Assume that everyone is at least as well off in x as y, and at least one is 
better off.   Then, for each i, v(x; i) ≥ v(y; i) for all v(.) in V, and moreover there is some j such that v*(x; j) > v*(y; j) 
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 To be sure, the recipe need not produce a complete ranking of outcomes, except in the 
limiting case where V is a singleton. Otherwise, there may well be a pair of outcomes, such that 
it is not the case that one is better than the other, nor is it the case that the two are equally good. 
But this is not troubling per se. 
 This amended account of an SWF—like the traditional definition—is agnostic about the 
form of the rule R, beyond requiring that it satisfy the minimal constraints.  Although Harsanyi 
is, famously, utilitarian—he presents his account of interpersonal comparisons within the context 
of a defense of utilitarianism—these two aspects of his view are logically separable.  He arrives 
at utilitarianism by combining that account with the further claim that an individual’s moral 
preferences over outcomes are identical to her extended preferences over the corresponding 
equiprobability lotteries.  
Now if individual i wants to make a moral value judgment about the merits of alternative social situations 
A, B, …, he must make a serious attempt not to assess these social situations simply in terms of his own 
personal preferences and personal interests but rather in terms of some impartial and impersonal criteria. 
…. 
 Individual i’s choice among alternative social situations would certainly satisfy this requirement of 
impartiality and impersonality, if he simply did not know in advance what his own social position would be 
in each social situation—so that he would not know whether he himself would be a rich man or a poor man, 
a motorist or a pedestrian, a teacher or a student, a member of one social group or a member of another 
social group, and so forth. More specifically this requirement would be satisfied if he thought that he would 
have an equal probability of being put in the place of any one among the n individual members of society 
…. 
 Let us capture this further aspect of Harsanyi’s view—relaxed to allow for heterogeneity 
in extended preferences—in the Equiprobability Premise. Use the symbol Ez to mean the 
equiprobability lottery corresponding to outcome z: the lottery over life-histories that gives a 1/N 
chance of life history (z;1), a 1/N probability of life-history (z; 2), …, a 1/N probability of life-
history (z; N), with N individuals in the population. 
The Equiprobability Premise 
Outcome x is morally at least as good as outcome y iff every spectator either has an 
extended preference for Ex over Ey, or is indifferent between them.45  
                                                                                                                                                             
for some v*(.) in V.   Because R satisfies strong Pareto, it follows that v(x) is ranked by R at least as good as v(y) for 
all v(.), and that v*(x) is ranked by R as better than v*(y).  
45 The Equiprobability Premise purports to state the conditions under which one outcome is at least as good as 
(better than or equally good as) a second, and thus those conditions are framed in terms of a universal spectator 
attitude of preference for the first or indifference.  
Note also that, on the Revised Account, spectators are not asked to rank lotteries except in the context of 
making within-subject judgments. So one might ask: what does it mean for a spectator to have an extended 
preference for Ex over Ey? After all, Ex is a lottery over histories with different subjects, and so too is Ey. Here, we 
can provide a derivative definition. Where vk(.)—unique up to a positive affine transformation-- represents k’s 
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It can be shown that the Equiprobability Premise, together with the Revised Account of 
interpersonal comparisons and the amended definition of an SWF, requires the SWF to be 
utilitarian. The following argument is valid.46 
 (1) Representability of Well-Being via a set V. There is a set V of utility functions that 
assign numbers to histories, and it thereby represents well-being comparisons of levels 
and differences via the set-valued rules mentioned earlier. 
 (2) The Amended Definition of an SWF. Outcome x is morally at least as good as outcome 
y iff, for all v(.) in V, v(x) is at least as good as v(y) according to some rule R for ranking 
utility vectors. 
 (3) The Revised Account. V is constructed as per the Revised Account.   
 (4) The Equiprobability Premise  
Conclusion: 
 Utilitarianism. Outcome x is at least as good as outcome y iff, for all v(.) in V, v(x) is at 
 least as good as v(y) according to the utilitarian rule.  
 However, the conclusion obviously does not follow from the first three premises alone. 
The proponent of prioritarianism, sufficientism, leximin, or some other non-utilitarian view, can 
endorse the first three premises, but deny the conclusion, by denying the Equiprobability 
Premise. 
 A different argument for utilitarianism should also be noted. This concerns a troubling 
arbitrariness in the construction of V. Remember that V includes utility function v1(.) 
representing the extended preferences of individual 1, utility function v2(.) representing the 
extended preferences of individual 2, and so forth. 
 Each vk(.) is not unique. If vk*(.) is a positive affine transformation of vk(.), then vk*(.) 
represents k’s extended preferences just as well as vk(.).  Thus V itself is not unique. For a given 
V, consider V*—formed by swapping one or more of the utility functions in V with positive 
affine transformations thereof. Then: (1) the functions in V* represent each person’s extended 
preferences just as well as the functions in V; and (2) V* produces the very same ranking of 
well-being levels and difference as V. For short, let us say that V* is an “admissible” 
transformation of V. 
 If the SWF is utilitarian, this non-uniqueness in V is not troubling. It can be shown that, if 
some V is exchanged for an admissible transformation thereof, and coupled with a utilitarian rule 
                                                                                                                                                             
within-subject preferences and across-subject judgments, k prefers any lottery L to any lottery L* if the expected 
value of L, according to vk(.), is greater than the expected value of L*, according to vk(.). 
46 See Adler (2011, ch. 5). 
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R for ranking vectors, the ranking of outcomes does not change. This is also true of the leximin 
SWF. However, various plausible non-utilitarian SWFs are not invariant to admissible 
transformations of V. For example, a prioritarian SWF that sums the square root of utilities is 
not, as illustrated by the following table: 
 
    Utility function v(.)   Utility function v*(.)  
    Outcome x Outcome y  Outcome x Outcome y 
  Individual 1  100  135   1100  1135 
  Individual 2  200  160   1200  1160 
  Utilitarian SWF  300  295   2300  2295  
  Sum of square root 24.14  24.27   67.81  67.75 
  of utilities      
 Given utility function v(.), v*(.) is defined as follows: v*(z; i) = v(z; i) + 1000. The first 
row shows that utility function v(.) assigns individual 1 a utility of 100 in outcome x and 
135 in outcome y; while v*(.) assigns individual 1 a utility of 1100 in outcome x and 1135 
in outcome y. The second row shows the numbers assigned by these two functions to 
individual 2.  The row for each SWF shows the numbers it assigns to the two outcomes, 
according to each utility function. Note that the utilitarian SWF ranks x over y according 
to both v(.) and v*(.). By contrast, the sum-of-square-root SWF ranks y over x according 
to v(.), but x over y according to v*(.).    
 
Indeed, it can be shown that a wide range of SWFs are sensitive to admissible transformations of 
V.47 
 Is this a devastating critique of the Revised Account, for those who endorse some such 
SWF?  Does it prove that this account fails to furnish the kind of interpersonal utilities required 
by the prioritarian SWF or sufficientist SWF, for example? I believe the Revised Account can be 
defended from this attack, along the following lines. Consider some SWF which is sensitive to 
admissible transformations of V. A particular numerical level of individual utility U* may 
possess a special kind of qualitative significance, for purposes of this SWF; how the SWF ranks 
utility vectors may change, in a qualitative manner, depending on whether the vectors contain 
entries above or below this number. (For example, the utility level 0 has special qualitative 
significance for purposes of the prioritarian SWF.48)  Imagine, now, that some history (x*; i*) 
has just the kind of moral role corresponding to the qualitative significance of the number U*. 
                                                 
47 This follows from Theorem 13.4 in Bossert and Weymark (2004), reporting a result proved by Deschamps 
and Gevers (1978). 
48 More precisely, this is true of the standard “Atkinson” form of the prioritarian SWF, 1 1
1
(1 ) N ii u
    , 
which is undefined with negative utilities. 
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Then a set V which represents individuals’ extended preferences, albeit “admissible” in that 
sense, is not admissible all-things-considered unless, for every v(.) in V, v(x*; i*) = U*.49 
 Unfortunately, I lack space to expand upon these brief remarks here. At a very minimum, 
the Revised Account is adequate for the needs of SWFs which are insensitive to “admissible” 
transformations of V—again, the replacement of one or more of the extended utility functions 
therein by a positive affine transformation. Such insensitivity is characteristic, not only of 
utilitarianism, but also of the leximin approach, as well as certain other standard SWFs50; and 
this in turn underscores that the Revised Account is severable from Harsanyi’s commitment to 
utilitarianism. 
V. Conclusion 
 Utility functions representing ordinary preferences are an insufficient basis for 
interpersonal comparisons. Assume that I rank a set of outcomes in some manner and you in 
some manner, and that my ranking is representable by a utility function, as is yours.  Even the 
preferentialist about well-being must concede that there is nothing, yet, which establishes how 
my well-being level in some outcome compares to your well-being level in some outcome, or 
how the difference between my well-being in two outcomes compares to the difference between 
yours in two.   Harsanyi’s fertile insight was that interpersonal comparisons can be constructed 
by changing the arguments for preferences.  Endow individuals with extended preferences, 
which take individual histories (not outcomes) and individual-history lotteries as their 
arguments; represent these extended preferences via extended utility functions. 
 This insight, however, was not adequately developed by Harsanyi.  In this Article, I have 
both identified the gaps and flaws in Harsanyi’s account of interpersonal comparisons, and 
suggested how they might be remedied.  In particular, for an individual (a “spectator”) to rank 
histories is not for her to imagine that she stands in the subjects’ shoes—that she acquires their 
attributes—but, rather, to rank outcomes with an appropriate attitude (wholehearted sympathy) 
or making an appropriate judgment.51  Nothing in the common causal basis for ordinary or 
extended preferences requires that extended preferences be identical.  Extended preferences can 
be represented by a set V of extended utility functions (which becomes a singleton only in the 
limiting case where everyone’s extended preferences happen to be identical); and although this 
set can provide the input for a utilitarian SWF, the SWF can also be non-utilitarian. 
Sources 
                                                 
49 See Adler (2011, ch. 3), “zeroing out” extended utility functions by requiring that they assign 0 to 
nonexistence; Blackorby, Bossert, and Donaldson (2005, pp. 37-38). 
50 In particular, it is true of the “rank-weighted” SWF, which is closely related to the Gini coefficient. 
51 In the case where the subjects of two histories are identical, the spectator’s extended preferences regarding 
the histories are equivalent to his ranking of the component outcomes with an attitude of sympathy directed towards 
the subject. In the case where the subjects are non-identical, the spectator ranks the histories by making a judgment 
regarding the comparative well-being of the two subjects in the component outcomes.  See Part III.A.  
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